2008年7月30日 星期三

美國牛肉在韓國

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韓國總統李明博,在總統大選前被視為韓國經濟的救星,但是在上任後百日內,支持度由52%降到20%,其中引發群眾上街抗議的導火線,就是重新開放美國牛肉進口的決定。我們知道韓國是單一民族國家,而韓國的近來外交路線,在李明博上任前,是比較傾向反美。因此為了牛肉進口的問題上街,可以視為是反美情緒的凝聚,正好對上李明博的親美路線。人民上街抗議,背後真正的因素是物價高漲、失業率增加等經濟層面的問題。如果李明博不開放牛肉進口,問題是否就跟著解決了? 並沒有。

從需求面來看,牛肉是韓國人的主要食物之一,但是韓國本身所飼養的牛肉,相對於進口牛肉並不便宜。因此在2001年韓國開始全面進口牛肉以後,很快的成為美國牛肉的世界第三大出口市場,直到2003年底才因為狂牛病風暴全面停止進口,。2003年12月,沒有美國牛肉以後,,韓國人牛肉消費量也大幅度下降:按平均每人消費牛肉量計算,2002年是 8.45公斤,2004年是6.84公斤,2006年是6.80公斤。其直接結果,是韓國人吃的牛肉在世界上最貴。2007年,平均每公斤達5.8萬韓元(約合60 美元)。

韓國人所消費的牛肉之中,有60%來自進口。根據近期的資料,韓國國產牛肉的市價,大約是 澳洲、美國牛肉的兩倍,韓國人所以還有人堅持買國產牛肉,主要是因為身土不二 (不吃外國進口食物,只吃本國產的食物,身體才會健康)的觀念在支持這樣的消費行為。李明博為了FTA的交換條件,讓美國牛肉重新進口,導致他的領導陷入危機,在數個月前,也有韓國新聞媒體炒作牛病的議題,但是有趣的是美國牛肉在市面的銷路並不差(見下圖)。

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南韓民眾提冰桶排隊購買美國牛肉

今年4月19日,韓國進口美國牛肉協定簽訂的第二天,韓國產牛肉價格就下降8%。這充分說明,只要開放市場,韓國人就要吃上更便宜的牛肉。當然,韓國農民也要因為沒有貿易保護而失去巨大的利益。同月27日,約7000名憤怒的養牛戶舉著「被拋棄的畜產農戶」、「哭泣的韓牛農戶」標語,到政府大樓前集會抗議。

參與集會、示威的,不僅僅是農民,還包括初中生、高中生、大學生、家庭主婦、政界和演藝界人士,有的藝人還打出了「寧願吃毒藥,不吃美國牛肉 」的旗號。

這些反對者為進口禁令找到了各種各樣的理由:「韓國人患瘋牛病的幾率是美國人的3倍」,「美國出口給韓國的牛肉是本國人不吃的」,「韓國牛從沒有發生過一例瘋牛病。」,「30個月以上的牛患瘋牛病的幾率十分大」。

很像那麼一回事,美國牛肉太可怕了,我們要遠離美國牛肉,不能讓美國牛肉來傷害我們。 雖然曾有商人以進口牛肉偽稱韓國牛肉販賣,韓國牛肉和進口牛肉在標示上有明確的分別,韓國人可以自由選擇。同時韓國政府除了努力針對消費者疑慮消毒,也接著採取各種措施補貼養牛戶,包括取消1%的屠宰稅,對每頭韓牛補貼10萬-20萬韓元補貼。

但韓國人--尤其是韓國農民,顯然不僅僅關心自己要吃什麼牛肉,還關心別人要吃什麼牛肉。因為市場一旦開放,牛肉價格就要下降,他們的利益就要受損。而韓國政府對養牛戶的補貼,比不上他們能從進口禁令中所得到的利益,為了自己的利益,他們要限制其他韓國人與美國人進行貿易的自由。簡單的說,韓國因美國牛肉而起的多方交戰,牽涉的不只是國際貿易,有更多成分是韓國的民族主義和畜牧業的商業利益,再加上不同政黨之間的角力戰。台灣媒體只注意到民眾上街,李明博道歉,是典型的見樹不見林。

延伸閱讀

  1. 華人新視野(224)美國牛肉李明博危機
  2. 台灣瑪莎在南韓- 不想吃美國牛肉韓國
  3. 美牛肉需求與日俱增 進口商加快供應
  4. [社論] 憑空製造瘋牛病恐慌 各電視臺該當何罪
  5. 台灣心、韓國情- 朱立熙個人網站-韓國人的反美情結
  6. 韓國“牛肉風波”何以鬧這麼大?
  7. 美國帶骨牛肉今日入境下月中旬上市
  8. 美專家:韓國示威不單純是美國牛肉問題
  9. 牛肉問題背後的韓國民族主義
  10. 美國牛肉為何引發韓國危機
  11. 周克成:韓國的牛肉故事
  12. Searching for a U.S.-Korea Beef Import Understanding
  13. South Korea Plans to Resume U.S. Beef Imports     

2008年7月27日 星期日

疆獨組織警告襲擊北京奧運

根據明報報導,一個名為突厥斯坦伊斯蘭黨Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)的組織發放錄影帶,威脅襲擊京奧主辦及協辦城市。

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該組織在一段長約3分鐘的短片中,聲程7/21的在雲南昆明的3起爆炸案是由他們所策動,另外5月在上海的巴士爆炸案及廣州一間塑膠廠7月的爆炸,都是該組織所為。該組織警告,其成員已準備針對北京奧運和中國重要城市,尤其是主辦及協辦奧運比賽項目的城市,以前所未有的策略發動襲擊。該組織上月曾發表聲明,警告可能會發動生物武器襲擊,又指旗下的自殺式炸彈襲擊者已準備好在全球行動。

中國的新聞媒體尚未做出相關報導,但是根據中央社的報導,上海警方26日回應表示,全案的確是人為,但是和恐怖襲擊無關。

昆明的連續報炸案,目前仍在偵查中,日前有報導說警方已掌握相關線索,誓言在奧運前破案,然而在後續報導,昆明警方又否認這樣的說法。有趣的是這兩種截然不同的說法,竟然都是出自同一人,也就是昆明市公安局新聞發言人劉震。

至於這段影片及所述內容的真實性,目前也尚未證實,不過確定和東突組織關係密切的世界維吾爾人大會,發言人迪裡夏提表示:"這個視頻是新疆黨委書記王樂泉的一個陰謀,因為反恐是王樂泉鞏固其權力和地位的唯一法寶,這也是他向北京證明他的鐵腕政策非常有效,以換取北京對他的長期信任。" 而中國喉舌針對這個新聞,是認該組織在虛張聲勢,強調中國政府已有充分的準備面對各種可能的恐怖攻擊。

接下來的發展,主席認為有以下幾點值得注意

  1. 公車爆炸案是否會為破案而破案,隨便找個余文來交差 ?
  2. 奧運期間各個重點城市都高度戒備,部分地區形同半戒嚴,是否可能因為軍警過度調度,反而在二三級城市有可乘之機 ?
  3. 如果奧運期間發生重大事件,中國是不是會排除雜音,執意持續辦下去?

延伸閱讀:

  1. 昆明警方奧運前誓破爆炸案
  2. 昆明警方:“從沒說過奧運前偵破公交車爆炸案” -
  3. Group threatens Olympics attack, claims bombed buses
  4. 昆明公交車爆炸案敲響反恐警鐘
  5. 中國警方:上海公車爆炸案與恐怖襲擊無關
  6. 昆明警方稱爭取奧運會前偵破公交爆炸案
  7. 中國否認兩起公交車爆炸與東突有關

2008年7月22日 星期二

China’s Guerrilla War for the Web

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主席這次選讀的文章,是David Bandurski發表於遠東經濟評論的文章,題目是China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,主要討論的是中國如何利用數十萬名"網評員" (俗稱五毛),來做網路言論的引導及控制。以下是本文的全文:

China’s Guerrilla War for the Web

by David Bandurski

They have been called the “Fifty Cent Party,” the “red vests” and the “red vanguard.” But China’s growing armies of Web commentators—instigated, trained and financed by party organizations—have just one mission: to safeguard the interests of the Communist Party by infiltrating and policing a rapidly growing Chinese Internet. They set out to neutralize undesirable public opinion by pushing pro-Party views through chat rooms and Web forums, reporting dangerous content to authorities.


By some estimates, these commentary teams now comprise as many as 280,000 members nationwide, and they show just how serious China’s leaders are about the political challenges posed by the Web. More importantly, they offer tangible clues about China’s next generation of information controls—what President Hu Jintao last month called “a new pattern of public-opinion guidance.”


It was around 2005 that party leaders started getting more creative about how to influence public opinion on the Internet. The problem was that China’s traditional propaganda apparatus was geared toward suppression of news and information. This or that story, Web site or keyword could be banned, blocked or filtered. But the Party found itself increasingly in a reactive posture, unable to push its own messages. This problem was compounded by more than a decade of commercial media reforms, which had driven a gap of credibility and influence between commercial Web sites and metropolitan media on the one hand, and old party mouthpieces on the other.


In March 2005, a bold new tactic emerged in the wake of a nationwide purge by the Ministry of Education of college bulletin-board systems. As Nanjing University, one of the country’s leading academic institutions, readied itself for the launch of a new campus forum after the forced closure of its popular “Little Lily” BBS, school officials recruited a team of zealous students to work part time as “Web commentators.” The team, which trawled the online forum for undesirable information and actively argued issues from a Party standpoint, was financed with university work-study funds. In the months that followed, party leaders across Jiangsu Province began recruiting their own teams of Web commentators. Rumors traveled quickly across the Internet that these Party-backed monitors received 50 mao, or roughly seven cents, for each positive post they made. The term Fifty Cent Party, or wumaodang, was born.


The push to outsource Web controls to these teams of pro-government stringers went national on Jan. 23, 2007, as President Hu urged party leaders to “assert supremacy over online public opinion, raise the level and study the art of online guidance, and actively use new technologies to increase the strength of positive propaganda.” Mr. Hu stressed that the Party needed to “use” the Internet as well as control it.


One aspect of this point was brought home immediately, as a government order forced private Web sites, including several run by Nasdaq-listed firms, to splash news of Mr. Hu’s Internet speech on their sites for a week. Soon after that speech, the General Offices of the cpc and the State Council issued a document calling for the selection of “comrades of good ideological and political character, high capability and familiarity with the Internet to form teams of Web commentators ... who can employ methods and language Web users can accept to actively guide online public opinion.”


By the middle of 2007, schools and party organizations across the country were reporting promising results from their teams of Web commentators. Shanxi Normal University’s 12-member “red vanguard” team made regular reports to local Party officials. One report boasted that team members had managed to neutralize an emerging BBS debate about whether students should receive junior college diplomas rather than vocational certificates, the former being much more valuable in China’s competitive job market. “A question came up among students about what kind of diplomas they would receive upon graduation,” the university report read. “A number of vanguards quickly discovered the postings and worked together to enforce guidance with good results.”


China’s Culture Ministry now regularly holds training sessions for Web commentators, who are required to pass an exam before being issued with job certification. A Chinese investigative report for an influential commercial magazine, suppressed by authorities late last year but obtained by this writer, describes in some detail a September 2007 training session held at the Central Academy of Administration in Beijing, at which talks covered such topics as “Guidance of Public Opinion Problems on the Internet” and “Crisis Management for Web Communications.”


In a strong indication of just how large the Internet now looms in the Party’s daily business, the report quotes Guan Jianwen, the vice president of People’s Daily Online, as saying during the training session: “In China, numerous secret internal reports are sent up to the Central Party Committee through the system each year. Of those few hundred given priority and action by top leaders, two-thirds are now from the Internet Office [of the State Council Information Office].”


The CCP’s growing concern about the Internet is based partly on the recognition of the  Web’s real power. Even with the limitations imposed by traditional and technical systems of censorship—the best example of the latter being the so-called “Great Firewall”—the Internet has given ordinary Chinese a powerful interactive tool that can be used to share viewpoints and information, and even to organize.


But the intensified push to control the Internet, of which China’s Web commentators are a critical part, is also based on a strongly held belief among Party leaders that China, which is to say the CCP, is engaged in a global war for public opinion. In Gongjian, a book released earlier this year that some regard as President Hu’s political blueprint, two influential Party theorists wrote in somewhat alarmist terms of the history of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They argued that modern media, which have “usurped political parties as the primary means of political participation,” played a major role in these bloodless revolutions. “The influence of the ruling party faces new challenges,” they wrote. “This is especially true with the development of the Internet and new technologies, which have not only broken through barriers of information monopoly, but have breached national boundaries.”


In 2004, an article on a major Chinese Web portal alleged that the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Japanese government had infiltrated Chinese chat rooms with “Web spies” whose chief purpose was to post anti-China content. The allegations were never substantiated, but they are now a permanent fixture of China’s Internet culture, where Web spies, or wangte, are imagined to be facing off against the Fifty Cent Party.


Whatever the case, there is a very real conviction among party leaders that China is defending itself against hostile “external forces” and that the domestic Internet is a critical battleground. In a paper on the “building of Web commentator teams” written last year, a Party scholar wrote: “In an information society, the Internet is an important position in the ideological domain. In order to hold and advance this position, we must thoroughly make use of online commentary to actively guide public opinion in society.”


Mr. Hu’s policy of both controlling and using the Internet, which the authors of Gongjian emphasize as the path forward, is the Party’s war plan. Chinese Web sites are already feeling intensified pressure on both counts. “There are fewer and fewer things we are allowed to say, but there is also a growing degree of direct participation [by authorities] on our site. There are now a huge number of Fifty Cent Party members spreading messages on our site,” says an insider at one mainland Web site.


According to this source, Web commentators were a decisive factor in creating a major incident over remarks by CNN’s Jack Cafferty, who said during an April program that Chinese were “goons and thugs.” “Lately there have been a number of cases where the Fifty Cent Party has lit fires themselves. One of the most obvious was over CNN’s Jack Cafferty. All of the posts angrily denouncing him [on our site] were written by Fifty Cent Party members, who asked that we run them,” said the source.


“Priority” Web sites in China are under an order from the Information Office requiring that they have their own in-house teams of government-trained Web commentators. That means that many members of the Fifty Cent Party are now working from the inside, trained and backed by the Information Office with funding from commercial sites. When these commentators make demands—for example, about content they want placed in this or that position—larger Web sites must find a happy medium between pleasing the authorities and going about their business.


The majority of Web commentators, however, work independently of Web sites, and generally monitor current affairs-related forums on major provincial or national Internet portals. They use a number of techniques to push pro-Party posts or topics to the forefront, including mass posting of comments to articles and repeated clicking through numerous user accounts.


“The goal of the government is to crank up the ‘noise’ and drown out progressive and diverse voices on China’s Internet,” says Isaac Mao, a Chinese Web entrepreneur and expert on social media. “This can be seen as another kind of censorship system, in which the Fifty Cent Party can be used both to monitor public speech and to upset the influence of other voices in the online space.”


Some analysts, however, say the emergence of China’s Web commentators suggest a weakening of the Party’s ideological controls. “If you look at it from another perspective, the Fifty Cent Party may not be so terrifying,” says Li Yonggang, assistant director of the Universities Service Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “Historically speaking, the greatest strength of the CCP has been in carrying out ideological work among the people. Now, however, the notion of ‘doing ideological work’ has lost its luster. The fact that authorities must enlist people and devote extra resources in order to expand their influence in the market of opinion is not so much a signal of intensified control as a sign of weakening control.”


Whatever the net results for the Party, the rapid national deployment of the Fifty Cent Party signals a shift in the way party leaders approach information controls in China. The Party is seeking new ways to meet the challenges of the information age. And this is ultimately about more than just the Internet. President Hu’s June 20 speech, the first since he came to office in 2002 to lay out comprehensively his views on the news media, offered a bold new vision of China’s propaganda regime. Mr. Hu reiterated former President Jiang Zemin’s concept of “guidance of public opinion,” the idea, emerging in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre, that the Party can maintain order by controlling news coverage. But he also talked about ushering in a “new pattern of public-opinion guidance.”


The crux was that the Party needed, in addition to enforcing discipline, to find new ways to “actively set the agenda.” Mr. Hu spoke of the Internet and China’s new generation of commercial newspapers as resources yet to be exploited. “With the Party [media] in the lead,” he said, “we must integrate the metropolitan media, Internet media and other propaganda resources.”


Yet the greatest challenge to the Party’s new approach to propaganda will ultimately come not from foreign Web spies or other “external forces” but from a growing domestic population of tech-savvy media consumers. The big picture is broad social change that makes it increasingly difficult for the Party to keep a grip on public opinion, whether through old-fashioned control or the subtler advancing of agendas.


This point became clear on June 20, as President Hu visited the official People’s Daily to make his speech on media controls and sat down for what Chinese and Western media alike called an “unprecedented” online dialogue with ordinary Web users. The first question he answered came from a Web user identified as “Picturesque Landscape of Our Country”: “Do you usually browse the Internet?” he asked. “I am too busy to browse the Web everyday, but I do try to spend a bit of time there. I especially enjoy People’s Daily Online’s Strong China Forum, which I often visit,” the president answered.


On the sidelines, the search engines were leaping into action. Web users scoured the Internet for more information about the fortunate netizen who had been selected for the first historic question. Before long the Web was riddled with posts reporting the results. They claimed that Mr. Hu’s exchange was a “confirmed case” of Fifty Cent Party meddling. As it turned out, “Picturesque Landscape of Our Country” had been selected on three previous occasions to interact with party leaders in the same People’s Daily Online forum.
For many Chinese Internet users, these revelations could mean only one thing—Party leaders were talking to themselves after all.


Mr. Bandurski is a free-lance journalist and a scholar at the China Media Project, a research program of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong.

 

延伸閱讀

  1. 遠東經評:中共「五毛」是怎樣煉成的
  2. 中國真相簿- 嘔心瀝血的支那「網評員」
  3. 年糕料理館:[06006]中國網評員- 樂多日誌

2008年7月18日 星期五

巴肚夭夭嘛祙挺馬蕭

7/15的蘋果日報,提到馬英九在與媒體的座談中提到" 政府煞費苦心在一個月推出很多政策,但是「我們的報紙跟國際的報紙不一樣,這兩個月來,國際媒體最關心的,就是兩岸的直航,因為他們覺得這是具有高度、深度、廣度的決策,會整個改變東亞地區的形勢!」" ,言下之意,似乎認為民生問題是缺乏高度,深度,廣度,沒有國際觀的國內媒體才會列為首要議題。

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因此被在野黨立委批評,認為馬的說法,彰顯其迴避人民對經濟搞不好的質疑,把大陸當第一線,把國內經濟當第二線。

但是在選前,馬先生面對對手猛攻綠卡議題,他的回應如下:

"這個問題我就到此為止,他以後再問我任何特別的問題,我不會再答覆了。我覺得他只關心過去,我關心台灣的未來。我覺得我真的沒有時間在這些議題上再去耗費。太多基層的民眾跟我講,你要關心台灣的經濟,關心台灣的民生,關心台灣的弱勢,不是去回應人家的口水,我會按照這些民眾的期許,來繼續我下面的行程。"

關心經濟民生,顯然又僅止於選舉語言了。雖然馬先生的支持度像股市指數一樣直直落,甚至有人拿他所說的來開玩笑,說股市從9300的高度開始急速下滑到6900的深度,又上不分類股全跌的廣度,但是仍有死忠支持者表示要給他更多的時間,也就是所謂的巴肚夭夭也要挺馬蕭

延伸閱讀

  1. 馬怨媒體輕兩岸 重民生
  2. 買股慘賠菜籃族投水亡
  3. 民眾憂油價漲問題根本在經濟
  4. 馬英九上任兩月不滿意度超過五成
  5. 綠卡風暴 馬英九:關心民生經濟不再回應  

2008年7月14日 星期一

要統,不獨,不武

 

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2008/7/14自由時報,以頭條報導這樣的訊息: 關中:國民黨長期執政 統一水到渠成,報導指出,

"國民黨副主席關中日前在中國湖北參加台灣周活動時指出,若國民黨得以長期執政,兩岸水到渠成的和平統一,是國民黨的「衷心希望」。前海基會副董事長兼秘書長邱進益也在杭州兩岸研討會上提出所謂的「和平協議」草案,主張大陸承諾非武力,台灣絕不從事任何分離行動。

對文匯報等所刊載關中的說法,總統府發言人王郁琦表示,這是關副主席的個人看法,總統府沒有評論,馬總統對兩岸「不統、不獨、不武」的立場,沒有任何改變。關中則一直未接電話,無法獲知本人看法。"

針對要不要獨,關中表示" 來四年對兩岸關係發展來說是「關鍵時刻」,國民黨在重新掌權的首屆任期內肩負著一項非常重大的工作責任,即改變島內積累下來的「去中國化」、「台獨化」思想,將其影響降低到不足以影響台灣和大陸關係的地步,「但這也需要大陸方面的協助」。"

關中是國民黨副主席,也是重要的操盤手,如果代表國民黨未來的政策方向, "不統"是騙人的,"不獨"才是真的。至於"不武",可以從以下這幾則新聞來檢驗

IDF提升性能 傳政院喊卡

台灣反軍購? 馬有責任講明白

視中國為救主的自卑心態如何能談國防?

以台灣的當前的外交情勢,新一代武器的來源,不是向美國採購,就是透過美國技術轉移自行製造。針對外購的部分,馬先生說"台灣採購防衛性武器的政策沒有改變,但是美國內部有很多意見,令台灣"很為難 ",把自己該負的責任,全部推給美國。採購案是否能過仍有待觀察,但是馬政府對軍購的態度前後不一,恐怕才是生變的主因。已經編列運執行的 IDF性能提昇案喊卡,顯然是自廢武功。

所以馬先生的"不統不獨不武", 其實是要統,不獨,不武,各位看清楚了嗎?再來回顧一下馬先生過去說的:

主席在此建議馬先生,仿照過去的余文模式,把發言人王郁琦給換掉,這樣就可以繼續不沾鍋了。

延伸閱讀:

  1. 文匯報- 關中:致力寶島「去台獨」化
  2. 執意化獨漸統 民意置何地
  3. 「暫緩」羅生門軍購夜長夢多
  4. 暫緩軍售案美台互推諉
  5. 翔展案若成IDF將具對地攻擊能力
  6. 暗批蘇起藍委:政府應處理好對大陸和美關係
  7. 蘇起要為軍售凍結負起責任

2008年7月10日 星期四

中國台北代表隊

言必稱九二共識的馬英九先生,曾經在2008年初,中國強力鎮壓西藏說"不排除抵制奧運"

然而我們看看中國在打算以主辦奧運之名,大搞政治外交攻防戰,或是搞小手段給台灣穿小鞋,台灣政府的官員有什麼反應呢? 外交部長歐鴻鍊表示 "奧運已經舉行很多屆,有一定的運作模式與遊戲規則,他相信,不會有打壓台灣選手的事情發生"。這樣的反應,與吳伯雄的感覺對岸不會對台射飛彈如出一轍。

在7月9日,中國國台辦發言人說  "中國台北」和「中華台北」都是英文Chinese Taipei的中文譯文。兩岸奧委會協定不涉及協定以外的大陸其他團體、組織和人士使用「中國台北」譯文的權利,使用「中國台北」也不能說成是矮化台灣。", 大陸委員會副主任委員張良任,對於此事表示 "「中華台北」是兩岸奧委會在1989年達成的共識,大陸堅持使用「中國台北」相當不妥,政府堅決反對。然而中國卻表示"國際新聞中心係由大陸全國記協等組織構成,不屬於國際奧會框架。而「中國台北」是大陸的習慣用語,大陸媒體、組織、團體稱呼「中國台北」是矮化台灣的說法,「是說不通的」。"

但是我們可以回顧一下去年的馬先生,對於"中國台北"似乎有不同的態度

此話一出,引起很大的風波,民進黨忙著罵,國民黨忙著滅火,顯然"中國台北"是沒有共識,無法接受的。

"中國台北"行不通,那"中國台灣地區"呢? 7/8有一則關於奧運新聞中心的報導,提到

2008北京奧運國際新聞中心8日開始投入使用,預計接待超過一萬名來自中外的奧運會非註冊記者。台灣在這裡不被視為「中華台北」,而是中國大陸的省市區,在全國省市區文宣品架子中,在香港、澳門之後就擺放著標明「台灣」的宣傳架。

根據記者今天實地察看,在北京奧運主新聞中心,台灣被稱為「中華台北」,台灣租用的辦公空間門口標牌為「中華台北奧委會」。
但是到了北京奧運國際新聞中心,一上二樓就設有「港澳台記者接待處」,旁邊排列著各省市區的文宣品置放架,從北京、天津開始三十一個省市自治區,分別放置政府文宣、旅遊介紹資料供人取閱,最後三個文宣架分別標明香港、澳門、台灣。

這些小動作,未來可能還會有其他新手法,例如開幕儀式的出場順序,以及頒獎典禮使用的"國歌"和"國旗",如果真的發生了,請問外交部長要不要下台負責,馬先生要不要下令代表隊成員全部打道回府以示抗議?

延伸閱讀:

  1. 北京奧運國際新聞中心台灣列名中國大陸地區
  2. 奧運文宣中文版矮化我為中國台北
  3. 中央社一則「中國台北」報導 兩岸興波
  4. 友邦高層參加奧運開幕式外交部稱不影響邦交
  5. Chinese Taipei 大陸硬拗「中國台北」
  6. 陸委會:中華台北是共識反對使用中國台北
  7. 軟土深掘中國吃定了馬政權

2008年7月8日 星期二

誰統誰?

100273817
在7/6的自由時報,以頭版報導了馬英九打算恢復國統會的消息,雖然總統府隨即否認,表示"馬英九總統的理念是「不統、不獨、不武」,沒有任何計畫要重開國統會",但是隔天的自由時報顯然也很不給面子,不但沒有更正,還做了進一步的報導,點名參與討論的人員。主席這邊就根據線索來找人:

提示 可能答案 現職

負責馬總統兩岸決策的國安會高層人士

蘇起f_125219_1 國安會秘書長

某位曾任國民黨黨職的國安會諮詢委員

何思因
f_125219_2
國安會副秘書長

某位學者出身的總統府副秘書長

高朗
gaolang

總統府副秘書長

一位海基會高層人士。其中一位與會者,日前在接待陸客場合上,不稱馬總統而改稱「馬先生」,引起各方矚目。

高孔廉
gao
海基會副董事長/秘書長

宣稱不統不獨不武的馬先生這時候暗中要把已經被陳前總統給廢除的國統會借屍還魂,應該是想要實現父親化獨漸統的遺志。但是以現在國民黨取得完全執政權,政策又一面倒向中國,對於中國的軟硬攻勢毫無招架之力,到底是誰統誰,相信讀者已經心中有數了。

延伸閱讀:

2008年7月6日 星期日

直航商機的假相

7/4,中國的"大公網報導了台灣是如何迎接直航團的:

台各地紛出奇招蓄勢迎陸客

093508_20080703000026

TM-11

圖:為了讓大陸遊客一睹阿里山姑娘、少年的風情,嘉義縣即日起在阿里山車站前,每天都將舉辦四場的「鄒族與你共舞」歌舞活動(中央社)

為迎接四日正式啟動的兩岸周末包機及大陸旅客赴台觀光,台灣各行各業全力作準備。「行政院長」劉兆玄三日特別趕到桃園機場作最後視察。他強調,這是兩岸關係發展的歷史性時刻,一定要確實做好相關準備。

【大公報訊】據中通社三日報道:針對七月四日就要正式啟動的兩岸周末包機及大陸旅客赴台觀光,台灣各界高度重視。「行政院長」劉兆玄三日特別發表談話指出,開放大陸觀光客來台,將可以繁榮周邊產業,增加就業機會,為了迎接這個歷史性時刻,一定要確實做好全部準備工作。

劉兆玄再視察桃園機場

劉兆玄上午在交通部部長毛治國、桃園縣縣長朱立倫以及立委等陪同下親到桃園機場進行視察,儘管時間十分緊迫,劉兆玄還是加快腳步走完整個機場,包括海關、出入境安檢、鈔幣兌換、免稅購物,以及旅客入境棄置蔬果箱和發燒篩檢站、旅客行李檢查和旅客接待等,都巡視一圈。

劉兆玄在完成視察後對相關準備措施相當滿意。他說,開放大陸旅客來台觀光,不僅可以促進台灣經濟,同時也對兩岸和平互動、深化交流等具有無形的加分,而且台灣觀光產業可以藉由接待大陸旅客來台的機會,全面提升素質,未來更可以吸引到其他國際旅客。

千萬獎金吸引旅社?客

為迎接大陸觀光客到來,台灣各縣市、各大風景區連月來都在緊鼓密鑼地作準備,部分縣市甚至紛紛祭出重賞,掀起「搶客、留客大戰」。例如台北縣出手逾千萬元(新台幣,下同),前一萬五千名大陸客通通有獎,另提供優厚獎金給年底前安排一千名以上陸客到台北縣的旅行社,前三十家績優業者每家二十萬元。

苗栗縣的獎勵辦法是,凡旅行社安排的行程令大陸觀光客在苗栗「停留四小時以上」,將招待一餐客家料理;安排在苗栗「過一夜」,依人頭每人補助二百元,如全團大陸觀光客人數超過四十五人,將協助安排表演活動;花蓮縣政府則編列一百六十萬元預算,補助每架來花蓮的包機八萬元。

台中環保局更全面動員,改善重點風景區的設施,局長李立德更透露,已獲得當局補助兩百八十三萬,全面改善美術園道、逢甲商圈等三十二處公廁。環保局呼籲觀光服務業的老闆們,店面門前天天掃,市容整潔商機好。

銀行各顯神通搶商機

開放大陸旅客赴台觀光不僅令旅遊業忙翻天,就連銀行業也全體總動員,積極搶商機。例如國泰金融集團三日宣布與中國東方航空進行商務合作,雙方將發行聯名信用卡,爭取商務客群,只要以該聯名卡刷卡購物,就可累積紅利兌換航空點數。

此外,新光金控三日也宣布,將與大陸海航集團合作,成立大陸新光海航人壽,提供海航旅客來台一系列金融、百貨、健檢等優惠專案,希望能利用大陸客來台觀光爭取一些商機。

注意上面的紅字部分,錢是出自縣政府的預算,那買單的是誰? 當然是各位納稅人。這種有好處不給全民分享,卻獨厚中國觀光客的做法,真的是"以台灣為主,對人民有利"嗎?  馬先生你都沒有意見嗎?

阿里山的商家是否有因為中國觀光客而改善生意,我們來看記者的實地採訪:

媒體和政府大吹特吹的直航商機,原來是用納稅人的錢營造出來的假相,,這種吃裏扒外的 不要臉行為,主席的評語是,這好比是把自己的女兒給人白嫖,嫖完了還問嫖客爽不爽

延伸閱讀

  1. 北縣拚觀光搶陸客周錫瑋將登陸攬客
  2. 苗縣/親迎陸客到來劉政鴻大方贈伴手禮
  3. 迎首發團五星飯店總動員
  4. 喝台啤吃雞排陸客「夢想成真」
  5. 陸客首發團/北市觀光局經典蔣夫人餐宴請大陸首發客
  6. 上頭交代?售物給陸客 含淚打對折

2008年7月3日 星期四

驚人的消費力?

品嘗道地的台灣美食,也是吸引中國觀光客來台的主題之一,不過可別以為夜市的業者因為中國客來台,荷包可以賺滿滿,相反的,夜市業者根本賺不到中國觀光客的錢,環境還變得更髒亂。

最近大家一股腦的討論說,中國觀光客來台會帶來多大的商機,但實地來到台北最大,也是全台最有名氣的士林夜市作調查,結果聽到的都是相反的。

東西十個人共吃一份,會不會太誇張?攤商們還透露,並不指望做中國客生意,只期望他們不要把夜市環境弄得更髒亂,連其他觀光客都不敢來。

最慘的是,可能賺不到中國客錢也就算了,前陣子夜市攤商們聯合漲價,一小碗生炒花枝的價格幾乎可以買一個便當,立刻重創夜市的人氣。

漲價、不漲價,生意都難做,想要中國客大手筆消費,似乎也不容易,這些小吃攤商們,也只能繼續期待真的會「馬上漸漸好」。